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1 Introduction
It is nowwidely recognized that in two-party political systems the proposed policies
need not converge to the ideal policy of the median voter. If parties care not only
about winning the elections but also about the implemented policies, and there is
uncertainty about the distribution of voters, the equilibrium strategies may well
dictate that each party propose a different policy. Some even argue that not only
are the proposals different from the median voter’s ideal policy, but they are also
somewhat polarized. Indeed, a considerable fraction of the presidential candidates
in the US are often claimed to be more radical than most members of their parties.1
There are several alternative explanations of polarized politics. In particular, in
an influential set of works, Alesina and Rosenthal [1],[2],[3], advance an argument
based on the incentives created by the “checks and balances” of the American
political system. They take the view that due to these “checks and balances” the
implemented policy is a compromise between the president and the Congress, and
this, in turn, gives each party an incentive to choose a radical policy. Since the final
policy will be in between the policies proposed by the parties (assuming that one
party wins the presidency and the other the Congress), it is in the interest of a party
to choose a radical policy to “move” the final policy in its desired direction.2
Of course, it makes sense to talk about more or less polarized proposals only
when parties can make credible commitments to their proposals. The situation con-
sidered by Alesina and Rosenthal [1],[2], is one in which such commitment does
not exist so that the proposal of a party coincides with its ideal policy. The “checks
and balances” still moderate the final policy but through the strategic actions of the
voters, not the parties. An interesting way to complement this sort of an investiga-
tion is, therefore, to consider the possibility that parties choose their candidates in
a strategic way while the individuals vote sincerely. This opens up strategic possi-
bilities for a party due to the fact that the ideal policies of the candidates of a party
need not be identical to that of the party. Thus, in this scenario the polarization
of party platforms in the elections may arise through strategic nomination of the
candidates by the parties.
In this paper we examine precisely this scenario, and try to understand if and
when polarization of platforms obtains through the route of strategic delegation to
the radicals. Put more concretely, our objective is to understand if there is any room
for political parties to nominate their candidates to influence the electoral strategy
1 Poole and Rosenthal [19] provides some empirical evidence showing that the political view of
candidates is often more radical than the average one within their own parties. It appears that parties
nominate radical candidates in actuality, who are then associated with radical policies. See Alesina and
Rosenthal [1] for more on this.
2 There are of course other explanations. Feddersen [9] provides a costly voting model that explores
the connection between voter participation and policy polarization. Baron [5] considers the effect of
lobbying in a model where parties seek to maximize the probability of winning. He shows that in
equilibrium policies will be polarized because parties have incentives to propose extreme policies in
order to please the lobby group. Ortun˜o-Ortin [17] provides a simple model without legislature in which
the implemented policy is a compromise between the two distinct policy proposals. In a similar vein
with Alesina and Rosenthal [3], Ghosh [13] shows that the possibility of post-election bargaining may
lead to pre-election policy extremism. Radical platforms can be also seen as the result of the greater
weight extreme members have in the party’s decision process.
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of the other party. This view sees the electoral process in itself as a mechanism
resembling the “checks and balances,” but one that operates prior to the elections.
We consider a largely standard model in which the policy space is unidimen-
sional and there is uncertainty about the distribution of voters’ preferences. There
are two ideological parties who would like to see their respective ideal policies im-
plemented, but they need to first obtain the approval of the majority of voters. Given
the surrounding uncertainty, both parties aim to maximize their expected utility. In
each party there is a set of potential ideological candidates which contains radicals
and moderate types. A radical (moderate) candidate has a more (less) extreme ideal
policy than the one associated with the party. In the first stage each party nominates
(simultaneously) its candidate. In the second stage candidates make credible policy
proposals. In the third stage voters vote and the winning candidate implements its
announced proposal. Our main result states that, under fairly general assumptions,
it cannot be the case that both parties delegate on moderate candidates in equilib-
rium: At least one of the candidates must be more radical than its party.3 In turn,
the platform declarations of the nominated candidates may or may not be more po-
larized than the platforms without delegation. Thus the model is consistent with the
often advanced view that the platforms adopted during the elections by otherwise
radical candidates may well be quite close to each other.4 Interestingly, however,
this situation obtains only when one of the nominated candidates is radical and
the other is moderate. The model maintains that when both of the parties choose
to nominate radical candidates, then the associated equilibrium platforms must be
more polarized than the platforms without delegation.
The main thesis of this paper may then be stated succinctly as follows: To
the extent that the nature of the political institutions maintain the feasibility of
credible platform commitments of the candidates, the political parties would have
strong strategic incentives to delegate to radical candidates. What is more, in such
circumstances, the nominated candidates would instigate more polarized platforms
than that would obtain in the absence of candidate delegation.5
As a passing remark, we note that our results are in concert with the empirical
evidence on the ideological position of the 1876–1988 US presidential candidates
reported in Alesina and Rosenthal [1] who compare the Poole and Rosenthal [18]
estimates of the liberal-conservative position of US presidential candidates to the
mean and one standard deviation position for the Senate. If we identify “radical”
candidates as the ones with an ideological position outside the ± one standard devi-
3 This conforms well with the factual observation made by Alesina and Rosenthal [1, p. 36]: “What
is striking is not just that presidential candidates [who served in the Congress], including the succesful
ones, were distant from the overall median [of the Congress] in many cases, but they often represented
relatively extreme positions within their own parties.”
4 See Calvert [7] and Alesina and Rosenthal [3].
5 One key assumption here is that the true type of the candidates are observable by the voters. While
this is surely a penetrating postulate, it appears quite realistic in the context of political competition
where the identities of the potential candidates in the elections are almost always exposed to the public
far before the actual nomination/primaries stage. Consequently, the usual arguments made against the
assumption of observability of contracts in the literature on strategic delegation do not really apply to
the present context. This, in our view, renders the investigation of the influence of strategic nomination
of candidates on the electoral process even more relevant.
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ation band, then the election in 1900, with McKinley and Bryan as the candidates,
is the only case in which both candidates are moderate. In the rest of the cases at
least one (but often not both) of the candidates is found to be radical.6 It is important
to notice that, as mentioned above, there are alternative models that can explain
the existence of radical candidates. Most of these models, however, do not provide
a satisfactory explanation of why we observe equilibria in which one candidate is
radical and the other candidate is moderate. By contrast, a major advantage of the
present model is its ability to sustain such interesting asymmetric equilibria.
2 The political delegation game
We consider a standard spatial competition model in which the policy space is the
interval [0, 1] and there is a continuum of agents. The agents are assumed to have
euclidean preferences on the policy space. Put precisely, following Alesina and
Rosenthal [2], we represent the preference relation of agent i ∈ [0, 1] by a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : [0, 1] → R given by
ui(z) := u (| z − i |) ,
where u : [0, 1] → R is an arbitrary twice continuously differentiable functionwith
u′ < 0 on (0, 1], u′′ < 0 and u′(0) = 0. It is clear that this specification endows
each agent with “single-peaked” preferences, and allows us to identify them with
their ideal policies.
We posit that there are two political parties, A and B, but depart from the stan-
dard Downsian model which envisages that the only motivation for the parties is the
desire to win elections. Instead, we model the political parties here as “ideological”
(or “policy-oriented”) by treating each of them as an agent with preferences over
the policy space (which may coincide, for instance, with that of the median or the
average member of the party).7
As is almost exclusively done in the literature, and to distill the basic argument
that we advance here to its simplest form, we ignore here the initial phase of the
primaries. Thus, denoting the ideal policy of party A by zA, we view the party A as
possessing the utility function uzA . Similarly, party B has the ideal point zB and
the utility function uzB . Since we think of the party A as the “left” party and B as
the “right” party, it is in the nature of things to assume that 0 < zA < zB < 1.
In the standard one-stage formulation of the associated voting game, parties
A and B simultaneously propose their policies, say, x and y, respectively. Given
the proposal profile (x, y), each agent votes for the proposal he likes the most.
6 The Poole-Rosenthal estimates are available only for those candidates who served in the Congress.
But as stated by Alesina and Rosenthal [1, p. 37], “. . . Even so, a casual observation of the candidates
who had not served in the Congress would suggest that although Dewey, Eisenhower, and Carter were
moderates, Stevenson, Dukakis, and Reagan were not. . . . moderate, middle-of-the-road politicians are
underrepresented as presidential candidates. . . . The evidence is clear: even though, once selected, can-
didates must compete for the presidency in a general election, they fail to adopt convergent positions.”
7 This alternative model is proposed and extensively studied in the seminal contributions of Wittman
[24],[25] and Calvert [7], and is adopted in a good number of recent papers (cf. Alesina and Rosenthal
[2],[3] and Roemer [20],[21]).
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Since agents have symmetric euclidean preferences, they vote for the one that is
the closest to their ideal policies. The party that obtains more than half of the votes
wins the election, and its proposed policy is then implemented. Ties are broken by a
random draw (i.e., each party wins with probability 1/2 in the case of a tie in votes).
Given that agents have “single-peaked” preferences, x is the winning proposal if
um(x) > um(y), where m is the median agent in the society.
Clearly, the only relevant information about the distribution of voters here is the
value of m. If both parties know this value, the assumption that parties are ideolog-
ical loses its significance, and in accordance with the median voter theorem, both
parties propose in equilibrium the same policy which coincides with the ideal point
of the median agent. However, here we shall make the more realistic assumption
that there is uncertainty about the distribution of voters, or more precisely, about the
value of the median type m. Consequently, in what follows, we treat m as a random
variable the distribution of which is common knowledge for the involved parties.
To simplify things at the onset, we shall assume initially that this random variable is
distributed uniformly on [0, 1].Aswill be demonstrated in the sequel (see Sect. 3.2),
this distributional assumption can be substantially weakened without altering the
basic message of the paper.
If parties propose (x, y), the average policy
x‖y := x + y
2
acts as the cutoff point in that, while the agent with ideal policy x‖y is indifferent
between x and y, any agent with type lower than x‖y prefers min{x, y} over
max{x, y}. In this case, party A wins the election if x < y and x‖y > m, or if
x > y and x‖y < m, while each party wins with probability 1/2 when x‖y = m.
Thus, given that m is uniformly distributed, the parties believe that, at the policy
profile (x, y), the probability that party A will win the election is given by
π(x, y) :=



x‖y, x < y
1/2, x = y
1 − x‖y, x > y
.
How does a party decide to propose a particular policy? Consider, for concreteness,
party A. Since we have identified the ideology of this party with the preferences
of an agent of type zA, who perhaps is the median member of the party, it is
somewhat reasonable to assume that this particular agent chooses x, the policy
proposal. However, it might be in the interest of this agent to delegate this decision
to a different agent, which will be referred to as a candidate for party A, in order to
fare better in the elections against party B. While such a candidate is presumably
a member of party A, she might nevertheless have an ideal policy different from
zA, and what is more, it is understood by everyone that this candidate herself will
declare a policy proposal for the party. Thus, there is room for the party (acting
as the delegator/principal) to strategize in its choice of a candidate (who will act
as the delegatee/agent). In particular, it may choose to go for a radical candidate
whose ideal policy a lies to the left of zA (that is, a < zA), or it may delegate to a
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moderate candidate with a ∈ (zA, zB ]. (The case a = zA can be interpreted as no
strategic delegation taking place.)
Before proceeding any further, let us reemphasize the way in which the delega-
tion takes place in the present model. We assume here that candidates are chosen
through nominations by the party leader or a committee of a few party members (as
in some European countries such as Italy), and not through the primaries. While
it will eventually be very interesting to augment the present model with a model
of primaries, the absence of a standard model in this regard and the complexity of
the voting game we consider here make this task hardly routine.8 To understand
the basic effect of strategic delegation in the context of political competition, it
seems reasonable at present to trivialize the primaries stage by considering candi-
dates as “nominated by the party.” While this admittedly falls short of providing a
formal model of elections with primaries (a challenging objective in and of itself),
it hopefully takes a step forward in this direction by providing a benchmark model
of two-stage elections.
This formulation brings us very close to the literature on strategic delegation.
It is then important to understand the information theoretic features of the present
environment. After all, sinceKatz [14], it is well understood in this literature that the
strategic delegation does not alter the equilibrium outcomes in simultaneous-move
games if the contracts between the principals and the agents are not observable.9
On the other hand, if the contracts are observable by all parties, various credible
commitment opportunities arise for the principals, and this yields a significant
alteration of the equilibrium that would have obtained in the absence of delegation.
It is important to note that, in contrast to firm theory, there is reason to view the
latter assumption as more suitable in our context. Indeed, it is hardly unreasonable
to assume that the preferences of the party and the preferences of any potential
candidate are, in effect, observable by the public. In the real world, the political
candidates are almost always well-known public figures whose reputations are well
established prior to the nomination stage. Thus it is without loss of much realism
to posit that the true types of the candidates are observable by all the concerned
parties. This, in turn, makes strategic considerations viable, and as we shall show
subsequently, has quite striking implications regarding the identity of the chosen
candidates.
To summarize, then,wemodel the political competition as a two-stage extensive
gamewith complete informationwhichwe refer to as the political delegation game.
In the first stage of the game the parties name simultaneously their candidates. The
set of potential candidates for party A is that of all moderate and radical agents
relative to the party ideal, i.e., [0, zB ]. Similarly, the action space of party B is
[zA, 1]. In the second stage of the game, the candidates choose (again simultane-
8 As noted by Alesina and Rosenthal [1, Sect. 2.7], the issues regarding primaries are quite com-
plicated due to the facts that these often take place in different dates in different states. Furthermore,
direct primary election laws differ significantly from state to state, and different systems are likely to
have markedly different strategic implications. See, Gerber and Morton [12] for an overall view of the
issues at hand.
9 This is not, however, necessarily the case when the original games played by the principals/parties
have a sequential structure. See Fershtman and Kalai [11] and Koc¸kesen and Ok [15].
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ously) their policy proposals, and the population vote sincerely over these policies
knowing that thewinning partywill implement its announced proposal (the credible
commitments scenario). As noted in the previous section, the question that we are
interested in here is if it is beneficial for the parties to choose radical candidates to
represent them in the elections.
To make things more precise, let us begin with analyzing the second stage game
played by the chosen candidates. The expected utility for candidate t at the proposal
profile (x, y) is given by the function Ut : [0, 1]2 → R as
Ut(x, y) := π(x, y)ut(x) + (1 − π(x, y) )ut(y), t = a, b. (1)
Thus, the candidate game played between the candidates a and b is defined formally
as
G(a, b) := ([0, 1], Ut)t=a,b.
(This formulation is identical to the one suggested by, say, Wittman [25], and is
largely standard.) A Nash equilibrium of G(a, b) is called a candidate equilibrium,
and the set of all such equilibria is denoted asN (a, b).Ageneric element ofN (a, b)
is in turn written as (x(a, b), y(a, b)).
Party A can nominate any candidate in [0, zB ] and party B any candidate in
[zA, 1]. Take an arbitrary candidate profile (a, b) ∈ [0, zB ] × [zA, 1], and consider
an equilibrium profile (x(a, b), y(a, b)) in N (a, b). We define
Π(a, b) := π(x(a, b), y(a, b))
which stands for the probability that the candidate of party A will win the elections
if the path of play has it that A chooses a, B chooses b, and the equilibrium
(x(a, b), y(a, b)) is played in the second stage of the game. In turn, the expected
utility of party T at this history is found as
VT (a, b) := Π(a, b)uzT (x(a, b)) + (1 − Π(a, b))uzT (y(a, b)), T = A,B. (2)
We then say that (a∗, b∗) is a party equilibrium, if
VA(a∗, b∗) ≥ VA(a, b∗) and
VB(a∗, b∗) ≥ VB(a∗, b) for all (a, b) ∈ [0, zB ] × [zA, 1].
Clearly, (a∗, b∗) and (x(a, b), y(a, b))(a,b)∈[0,zB ]×[zA,1] can together be thought of
as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the political delegation game described above.
As for the rationality demands of the candidate and party equilibria described
above, one major difficulty is the possibility of multiple candidate equilibria, which
gives rise to the well known coordination problems.Moreover, this possibility com-
plicates the subsequent analysis significantly. It will thus be useful here to introduce
an assumption on the primitives of the model that will get rid of this difficulty. For-
tunately, there is a somewhat natural way of doing this in our framework.
[A1]. u
′′
u′
is strictly decreasing on [0, 1].
To understand the conceptual basis of this assumption, consider two candidates
a < a′ and two policies x and y with a < a′ < x < y. Now consider any
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lottery on the policies x and y in which both policies may be adopted with positive
probability. By continuity of the preferences, there must exist a certainty equivalent
of this lottery, say z ∈ (x, y), for candidate a′; that is, a′ is indifferent between
the said lottery on {x, y} and the sure bet z. How about the candidate a? If [A1]
holds, then this candidate is not indifferent between these lotteries; (s)he prefers
the nondegenerate lottery to the sure bet z. So, in a clear sense, candidate a is less
afraid of losing the elections. That is, in the trade-off between probability of victory
and its proposed policy, a puts less weight on victory than candidate a′. Therefore,
a will choose a platform closer to its ideal point even though this increases the
probability of losing the election.10
The conceptual upshot here is that, given the platformof her competitor, a radical
candidate is more “rigid” on her views so that she is more uncompromising than
a more moderate candidate (in particular his/her own party). Interestingly, various
versions of this view has already been advanced in the literature. For instance, the
recent work of Blomberg and Harrington [6] focus on the beliefs of the agents, and
show that radical members of the U.S. Congress tend to be rigid whereas moderates
tend to be more flexible. This is precisely the implication of [A1] in the present
context in which the focus is on the utility functions of agents as opposed to their
beliefs.
Assumption [A1] turns out to be a very useful postulate for the present frame-
work for, in addition to its appealing conceptual basis, it endows the model with
a technical structure powerful enough to deliver a number of interesting formal
results. Foremost, this property alone entails the existence and uniqueness of the
candidate equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For any 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, there exists a candidate equilibrium (x∗, y∗) ∈
N (a, b), and we have a < x∗ < y∗ < b for any such equilibrium. Furthermore, if
[A1] holds, the candidate equilibrium of G(a, b) is unique.
This fact shows that the candidate game G(a, b) is quite well-behaved with regard
to the existence and uniqueness of its equilibria. Unfortunately, the same cannot
be said for the political delegation game in general. Indeed, this game is an infinite
extensive game with imperfect information (due to the simultaneity of moves in
the candidate game), and as is long known in game theory, it is quite difficult to
find primitive conditions for such games that guarantee the existence of equilibria.
Nevertheless, as we shall show below, it is still possible to identify the properties
of arbitrary equilibria of our political delegation game, when at least one such
equilibrium exists.
10 Notice that [A1] imposes that the absolute degree of risk aversion of the function u is strictly
increasing. While this may seem puzzling at first, we stress that u is not defined on wealth as in most
economic scenarios, where the opposite assumption is commonly maintained.
8
3 Main results
3.1 Two-sided radical delegation
What will be the structure of equilibrium candidate nominations of each party in the
political delegation game described above? Given the actions of others, nominating
a moderate candidate will increase the chances of winning the election for a party,
but perhaps at the cost of having to live with an implemented policy that is too
far from the party ideal. On the other hand, a radical candidate may prove to be
a poor competitor in the elections. Clearly, there is a trade off between increasing
the probability of winning and implementing a relatively desirable policy for each
party. Thus, a priori, it is not at all obvious if there exists a clear-cut prediction
about the structure of equilibrium nominations. Curiously, however, in the present
setting a very concrete answer is available:
Theorem 1. If [A1] holds, then a∗ < zA and b∗ > zB for any party equilibrium
(a∗, b∗), that is, both parties delegate in equilibrium to radical candidates.
The reasoning behind this result becomes relatively transparent once one recognizes
that the game played by any two distinct candidates in the second stage of the
political delegation game is actually supermodular. Thus there is a close relation
between Theorem 1 and the strategic delegation results obtained by Fershtman and
Judd [10] and Sklivas [22] in the case of a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated
outputs.11
While its formal proof is included in the Appendix, it may be a good idea to
provide some intuition for Theorem 1 at this point. Consider the situation in which
each party has nominated a candidate whose ideal point is identical to that of the
corresponding party. Why is it not possible for this to be a party equilibrium? The
key observation is that party A knows that the candidate zB has an increasing
reaction function. (This is because when her opponent proposes policies further
and further away from zB , the convexity of the preferences of candidate zB forces
her to view the increase in the probability of victory less pressing than the misery
that he will sustain in case of a loss, thereby pushing her to propose policies further
and further away from his own ideal to increase further the probability of victory.)
Consequently, given that in elections it will face a candidate of type zB , partyA has
an incentive to delegate to at least a slightlymore radical candidatea ∈ [0, zA).Such
a candidate may do slightly worse than the party itself in the elections with respect
to the probability of winning. But, due to the concavity of the party preferences,
this negative effect is dominated by the positive effect of forcing the other party to
propose a policy that is closer to zA than the previous one (which is presumably
quite far away from zA). Of course, party B reasons the same way, and hence the
best response dynamics maintain that, starting from the candidate profile (zA, zB),
11 We should note, however, that the technical structure of our model is more complicated than the
duopoly model analyzed by these authors who have assumed linear demand and cost structures (and
even than the generalization provided by Koc¸kesen, Ok and Sethi [16] who relaxed these linearity
assumptions). Indeed, in contrast with the present case, obtaining the analogue of Lemma 1 for linear
Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products is an easy exercise.
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one is to move to a more radical profile (see Figure 1). If an equilibrium exists, this
must be one in which both parties nominate a radical candidate.12
While it is interesting in its own right, Theorem 1 falls short of providing
a prediction regarding the polarization of platforms chosen by the candidates in
equilibrium. In principle, it could happen that our radical candidates propose plat-
forms that are less polarized than the platforms that would obtain in the absence of
delegation. In fact, it is possible that a radical candidate plays the voting game more
moderately than her own party in equilibrium.13 However, it turns out that the joint
play of radical candidates is bound to yield a more polarized pair of equilibrium
platforms relative to that induced by the play of the principal parties. To formalize
this point, let us agree to refer to a pair of platforms (x, y) as more polarized than
12 An interesting extension of themodel obtains by allowing the nominations to take place sequentially.
In this case, a corollary of the present analysis has it that the party who nominates its candidate after
the other party has nominated its own will delegate to a radical candidate in equilibrium. (The proof is
contained within the proof of Theorem 1.)
13 That is, N (a, b) need not be monotonic in a and b, a fact which is typical of Hotelling-type games.
A concrete example of a class of candidate games (with the ideal points of the society being distributed
according to a Beta law) that possess such non-monotonic equilibrium sets will be provided in Section 4.
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the pair of platforms (x′, y′) whenever |y − x| > |y′ − x′| . As a nontrivial impli-
cation of Theorem 1, we may then obtain the following result on the polarization
of equilibrium platforms in the present model.
Theorem 2. Let [A1] hold, and let (a∗, b∗) be a party equilibrium. If (x∗, y∗) ∈
N (a∗, b∗) and (x′, y′) ∈ N (zA, zB), then the platform (x∗, y∗) is more polarized
than the platform (x′, y′).
That is, in equilibrium, the (unique) pair of platforms chosen by radical candidates
is more polarized than the (unique) pair of platforms that would obtain had the
parties did not at all engage in delegation activities and instead played the game
themselves. Thus, in the present model, strategic nomination of the candidates
yields not only the polarization of the “types” of the running candidates, but also
that of the equilibrium platforms.
It is possible to illustrate Theorem 2 as well by using Figure 1. The key obser-
vation here (which requires formal proof) is that the slope of the reaction functions
of any radical candidate is lower than one. Moreover, a simple graphical argument
shows that any point (x, y) within the shaded area satisfies that y − x > y′ − x′.
But by Theorem 1 both of the candidates are radical and the equilibrium platforms
must be in the shaded area, and hence Theorem 2. A rigorous proof that formalizes
these steps is provided in the Appendix.
Finally, what of a welfare analysis? While the conclusions of the model are
ambiguous in most cases, Theorem 2 allows us derive a clear prediction in the case
where the ideal points of the parties are equally apart from the midpoint 1/2 of the
political continuum. In this case the expected policy without delegation coincides
with the expected policy with delegation. But Theorem 2 says that polarization of
platforms is greater with delegation, so the lottery (over platforms) in the absence
of delegation second order stochastically dominates that obtains with delegation.
Consequently, all voters (who have risk averse preferences) are found to be better
off without delegation in this particular case.
3.2 One-sided radical delegation
Theorems 1 and 2 suffer from two serious shortcomings. First of all, they use
crucially an unacceptably strong uniformity assumption regarding the distribution
of the median type in the population. Secondly, the conclusion of Theorem 1 is
somewhat “too strong” in the sense that empirical studies, as well as introspection,
indicate that it is not all that common that both the republicans and the democrats
in the US Presidential elections nominate radical candidates. Consequently, both
the theoretical reach and the predictive power of the model would be strengthened
if we could generalize the present analysis to cover a large class of distributions,
and as a result, “weaken” the conclusion of Theorem 1 from “both candidates are
radicals” to “at least one candidate is radical.” Our objective in this section is to do
precisely this.
In what follows, we consider the political delegation model introduced in Sec-
tion 2with the distribution of themedian type being given by an arbitrary absolutely
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continuous distribution function F : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with a strictly positive density
f : [0, 1] → R++. Consequently, the only modification of the formal model is
through changing the definition of the probability of winning function π to
π(x, y) :=



F (x‖y), x < y
1/2, x = y
1 − F (x‖y), x > y
at the policy profile (x, y). In what follows, the only regularity assumption we
impose on the distribution function F is a commonly used logconcavity postulate.
[A2]. Both F and 1 − F are logconcave functions.
It is well known that the most commonly used distribution functions satisfy this
assumption.14 In particular, the uniform distribution satisfies [A2], and hence the
present model is indeed a generalization of the one we considered in Sections 2 and
3.1.
It turns out that, under assumptions [A1] and [A2], the exact analogue of
Lemma 1 holds true. In fact, the assumptions [A1] and [A2] are actually all that
one needs to turn Theorem 1 to a one-sided radical delegation result. The following
is, then, our main finding:
Theorem 3. If [A1] and [A2] hold, then either a∗ < zA or b∗ > zB for any party
equilibrium (a∗, b∗), that is, at least one party delegates in equilibrium to a radical
candidate.
Wedonot obtain two-sided radical delegation in general because one cannot exclude
the possibility that the slope of the reaction function of one of the candidates is
downward sloping if |f ′(x‖y)| is high enough. In this case, the strategic effect
of delegation of moving the policy of the competing candidate closer to the ideal
point of the party is obtained by delegating to moderate candidates.15 Indeed, as
we shall show in Section 4, it is impossible to tighten Theorem 3 to a two-sided
delegation result. Nevertheless, Theorem 3 shows that it is still impossible to have
both candidates moderate. Consequently, the model at hand, in general, allows for
asymmetric equilibria in which one candidate is radical while the other is moderate
(which is in concert with the empirical evidence reported in Alesina and Rosenthal
[1] for the U.S. presidential elections).
At this level of generality, it is not possible to saymuch about the polarization of
the equilibrium platformswhen only one of the candidates is radical. But depending
on the precise structure of the distribution of the median type in the society, of
course, it is quite possible that both candidates are radical. In this case, the geometric
logic behind Theorem 2 kicks in, and we obtain a straightforward counterpart of
this result in the present (general) setup.
14 This assumption is weaker than log-concavity of the density function f ; see Barlow and Proschan
[4]. The normal, Laplace, gamma, exponential, beta (with restrictions on the parameters), Weibull and
Dirichlet are examples of logconcave distributions, seeCaplin andNalebuff [8]. An alternative (stronger)
assumption would be quasi-concavity of f . This is adopted in, for example, Weber [23].
15 This result is akin to the one in Fershtman and Judd [10] and Sklivas [22] where the chosen type of
delegation depends crucially on whether firms compete in prices (upward-sloping reaction functions)
or in quantities (downward-sloping reaction functions).
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Theorem 4. Let [A1] and [A2] hold, and let (a∗, b∗) be a party equilibrium with
a∗ < zA and b∗ > zB . If (x∗, y∗) ∈ N (a∗, b∗) and (x′, y′) ∈ N (zA, zB), then the
platform (x∗, y∗) is more polarized than the platform (x′, y′).
The welfare implications of this result is identical to the uniform case, provided
that the distribution associated with F is symmetric and the ideal points of the
parties are equally apart about the midpoint 1/2. In this case the expected policy
without delegation coincides with the expected policy with delegation, but due to
Theorem 4, all risk averse voters are better off without delegation.
4 Numerical examples
Due to its formal generality, there are a number of issues that we have left unad-
dressed in the analysis so far. First of all, at the moment we do not have a robust
example for which a party equilibrium exists. Second, it is not at present clear if
Theorem 3 can be tightened to a two-sided delegation result (as it is the case in
Theorem 1). Third, we do not yet know if the radicality of a candidate necessarily
translates into the radicality of her optimal platform choice in the elections. Finally,
little is said so far about the polarization of equilibrium platforms when there is
a only one radical candidate in the political competition. In this section, we shall
address each of these issues by means of a numerical example.16
We consider an example in which the ideal policy for party A is zA = 0.25
and the ideal policy for party B is zB = 0.935. The utility function of the agents is
ui(z) := − | z− i |1.2 which clearly satisfies [A1]. The median voter is distributed
according to the Beta distribution with parameters (c, d); we denote the associated
distribution function by F (·; c, d). In what follows we fix d = 2, and compute
the party and candidate equilibria for a sequence of (two hundred) economies
with different values of the parameter c, starting with c = 2.2 and increasing up
to c = 14. In all of these economies the distribution function F (·; c, 2) satisfies
assumption [A2]. Moreover, higher values of the parameter c can be thought of
as associated with a more conservative electorate17. More precisely, one can show
that, for all the values of the parameter c considered in this exercise, if c > c′ then
the distribution F (·; c, 2) first order stochastically dominates F (·; c′, 2).
In all of the economies considered here a unique equilibrium exists. The results
for three selected economies are provided in Table 1 where a∗ and b∗ are the
values of the candidates in the party equilibrium, and x∗ and y∗ are the equilibrium
platforms. We also report the equilibrium platforms x′ and y′ that obtain when
parties cannot delegate. Finally, the last column of Table 1 provides the probability
of victory for party A.
Notice that for the value of c = 8 the candidate of party A is moderate (0.25 =
zA < a
∗ = 0.2820). This shows that Theorem 3 cannot be tightened to a two-sided
16 The numerical computations were done using Mathematica, and the program is available from
authors upon request.
17 If we set c = d > 2 , increases of c can be seen as associated to a more concentrated electorate
around 1/2, i.e. a less polarized distribution of voters. One can easily show that a lower degree of such
polarization doesn’t not always imply a less polarized choice of candidates.
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Table 1
c a∗ b∗ x∗ y∗ x′ y′ π
3.15 0.2311 0.9986 0.3904 0.8594 0.3908 0.8470 0.49
8 0.2820 0.9433 0.6595 0.9259 0.6568 0.9213 0.414
12.95 0.2363 0.9362 0.7574 0.9338 0.7569 0.9327 0.341
delegation result: depending on the distributional specification of the model, there
may exist equilibria with only one candidate being radical.
It is also interesting to compare the platforms under the party equilibrium with
the platforms in the no delegation case. The example at hand demonstrates that the
candidate platforms do not necessarily monotonically depend on one’s ideal point.
For the value c = 12.95, we have a∗ < zA (the candidate is more radical than the
party) and yetx′ < x∗ (the candidate proposes in equilibrium a less radical platform
than the one proposed by her party in the no delegation case). However, not only is
(x∗, y∗) more polarized than (x′, y′) for c ∈ {3.15, 12.95} where both candidates
are radical (this is entailed by Theorem 4), but the same holds for c = 8 where
there is only one radical candidate (a case which is not covered by Theorem 4).
Thus, the example at hand suggests that our theoretical results on the polarization
of platforms provided in Section 3.2 might not depend on the two-sided radical
delegation result.
The questions raised in the opening paragraph of this section are thus answered.
The final order of business concerns the robustness of the numerical findings re-
ported here. In this regard we note that the present results are robust to changes
in the parameters and even in the choice of the distribution function. For instance,
we can generate similar results for the model with ui(z) := − | z − i |α and
F (z) = zβ for a continuum of different values of the ideal points zA and zB , and
parameters α > 1 and β ≥ 1.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to show that the feasibility of credible platform
commitments of the political candidates gives strong incentives to parties for choo-
sing their political leaders from the pool of relatively radical candidates. Under a
large set of circumstances, this, in turn, forces the political platforms declared by
the candidates in the elections to be more polarized than that would obtain in the
absence of delegation. This suggests that one of the major sources of the observed
nonconvergence of platforms in the real-world two-party political systems is the
very nature of the associated voting games that renders issues related to strategic
delegation duly relevant.
There are two major limitations of the present work which must be addressed
in future research. First of all, our entire analysis is confined to two-party elections.
Unfortunately, the required extension to more than two parties is by no means
routine since this requires a theory of government coalition formation. Perhaps a
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more pressing shortcoming is the silence of our approach with regard to the way
decisions are taken within a political party, that is, the trivial way we have modeled
the stage of primaries here. The absence of a standard game theoretical model of
primaries attests to the fact that this is an entirely nonroutine exercise, but onewhich
is to be necessarily taken up in the future.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The existence of an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) is obtained by a direct
application of Corollary 3.1 of Roemer [20]. To establish the rest of the assertions
in Lemma 1, let us first observe that ua and ub are C2 functions. That ua is C2
on [0, a) ∪ (a, 1] follows readily from the associated differentiability properties
of u. Moreover, we have D−ua(a) = −u′(0) = 0 = u′(0) = D+ua(a) and
D−u′a(a) = u
′′(0) = D+u′a(a) so that ua is C2 on the entire [0, 1] with
u′a(x) =
{
u′(x − a), x ≥ a
−u′(a − x), x < a and u
′′
a(x) =
{
u′′(x − a), x ≥ a
u′′(a − x), x < a .
An analogous reasoning applies also to ub. These findings also show that Ua and
Ub are C
2 everywhere on [0, 1]2 but the diagonal {(x, x) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
Let Bt : [0, 1] → [0, 1] stand for the best response correspondence of agent
t = a, b. An immediate application of Weierstrass’ theorem shows that Bt is well
defined. We now examine the structure of the map Ba a little further; similar obser-
vations apply also to the map Bb. Since Ua(a, a) = u(0) is the unique maximum
payoff for player a in the game G(a, b), we clearly have Ba(a) = a. Now take any
y = a and x ∈ Ba(y). It is easy to see that |a − x| ≤ |a − y| (for playing y for can-
didate a is a better response to y than playing any other x with |a − x| > |a − y|),
and hence ua(x) ≥ ua(y). But then, if a > x was the case, we would have
∂1Ua(x, y) = 12 (ua(x) − ua(y)) − (x‖y)u′a(x) > 0,
which contradicts that x ∈ Ba(y). Since ∂1Ua(a, y) = 12 (u(0) − ua(y)) > 0, we
must actually have x > a. Moreover, either x > y > a or x ≥ 2a− y > a implies
∂1Ua(x, y) = 12 (ua(x) − ua(y)) + (x‖y)u′(x − a) < 0,
disqualifying these ranges for x and y. Finally, since Ua(y, y) = ua(y), x = y > a
cannot hold for any x ∈ Ba(y) either. In summary, we have
x



∈ (a, y) y > a
= a, y = a
∈ (a, 2a − y) y < a
for all x ∈ Ba(y). (3)
Reasoning similarly for Bb, then, we may conclude that a < x∗ < y∗ < b, as we
sought. Another implication of (3) is that
ua(x) > ua(y) and u′a(x) > u′a(y) for all x ∈ Ba(y), y = a (4)
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since both u and u′ are strictly decreasing functions.
We next show that Ba is a single-valued correspondence. To see this, take any
y = a and x′, x′′ ∈ Ba(y).Given (3), we must have ∂1Ua(x′, y) = ∂1Ua(x′′, y) =
0. But unless x′ = x′′ this is impossible, because
∂11Ua(x, y) = u′a(x) + (x‖y)u′′a(x) < 0, a = y = x ≥ a,
that is, ∂1Ua(·, y) is a strictly decreasing function on [0, 1]\{y}. Thus, we may
conclude that Ba (and similarly, Bb) can be regarded as a function. (With a slight
abuse of notation, then, we shall viewBa(y) andBb(x) asmembers of [0, 1] in what
follows.) Moreover, since interiority of the associated maximization problems are
readily verified, we may use the first order conditions to write, for any x, y ∈ [0, 1],
1
2 [ua(Ba(y)) − ua(y)] + (Ba(y)‖y)u′a(Ba(y)) = 0 (5)
and
1
2 [ub (x) − ub(Bb(x))] − (1 − (x‖Bb(x)))u′b(Bb(x)) = 0 (6)
which characterize the functions Ba and Bb. By a standard argument based on
the implicit function theorem, we may further deduce that both Ba and Bb are
continuously differentiable functions. Implicitly differentiating (5) and rearranging,
therefore, we obtain
B′a(y) =
u′a(y) − u′a(Ba(y))
2u′a(Ba(y)) + (Ba(y) + y)u′′a(Ba(y))
.
By (4), we have B′a(y) > 0 whenever y = a, whereas B′a(a) = 0. We next claim
that
B′a(y) < 1 whenever y > a. (7)
To see this, observe that B′a(y) < 1 holds if and only if u′a(y) − u′a(Ba(y)) >
2u′a(Ba(y)) + (Ba(y) + y)u
′′
a(Ba(y)) which is implied by
u′a(y) − u′a(Ba(y)) > (Ba(y) + y)u′′a(Ba(y)). (8)
By (5), this last inequality can be rewritten as
(u′a(y) − u′a(Ba(y)))u′a(Ba(y)) − u′′a(Ba(y)) (ua(y) − ua(Ba(y))) < 0. (9)
In turn, since y > Ba(y) > a, (9) can be written as
(u′(y − a) − u′(Ba(y) − a))u′(Ba(y) − a) (10)
− u′′(Ba(y) − a) (u(y − a) − u(Ba(y) − a)) < 0.
Now define the differentiable function H : [0, 1] × (a, 1] → R by
H(v, k) := [u′(v − a) − u′(k − a)]u′(k − a)
− u′′(k − a) (u(v − a) − u(k − a)) .
Clearly, H(k, k) = 0. Moreover,
H1(v, k) = u′(k − a) u′(v − a)
[
−u
′′(k − a)
u′(k − a) +
u′′(v − a)
u′(v − a)
]
,
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so, by [A1], we have H1(v, k) < 0 whenever v > k. It follows that H(v, k) < 0
whenever v > k. Then, since y > Ba(y) > a, we find H(y,Ba(y)) < 0 which is
nothing but what is claimed in (10). As noted earlier, this, in turn, proves (7). An
analogous observation also holds for Bb.
The uniqueness of equilibrium is now proved by a straightforward contraction
argument. Let (x∗, y∗) and (x∗∗, y∗∗) both belong to N (a, b). Then we must have
(x∗, y∗) = B(x∗, y∗) and (x∗∗, y∗∗) = B(x∗∗, y∗∗) where B : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 is
defined by B(x, y) = (Ba(y), Bb(x)). But then, since y∗, y∗∗ > a must hold (as
was established earlier), by using (7) and the analogous finding for Bb, we observe
that (x∗, y∗) = (x∗∗, y∗∗) yields the contradiction:
‖B(x∗, y∗) − B(x∗∗, y∗∗)‖1 = |Ba(y∗) − Ba(y∗∗)| + |Bb(x∗) − Bb(x∗∗)|
< |y∗ − y∗∗| + |x∗ − x∗∗|
= ‖(x∗, y∗) − (x∗∗, y∗∗)‖1
= ‖B(x∗, y∗) − B(x∗∗, y∗∗)‖1 .
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider first the case inwhich b∗ = zA < zB . In this case, a∗,
being the best response of partyA,must equal zA.But then delegating to zB (instead
of to b∗) is a better response for party B. Consequently, we have zA < b∗. One
can similarly check that a∗ < zB . Moreover, zA < b∗ ≤ a∗ < zB cannot hold,
for in this case delegating to a∗ is a better response for party B. Consequently,
we are left with two possibilities: zA ≤ a∗ < b∗ and a∗ < zA < b∗. In what
follows our objective is to eliminate the possibility of the former case. To this end,
define the nonempty interval J := [zA,min{b∗, zB}), and let x(a) := x(a, b∗) and
y(a) := y(a, b∗) for all a ∈ J, where (x(a, b∗), y(a, b∗)) is the unique equilibrium
in N (a, b∗). By Lemma 1 we know that x(a, b∗) < y(a, b∗), and hence, provided
that a < b∗, bothUa andUb∗ areC2 around an open neighborhood of (a, b∗). Thus,
the following first order conditions must be satisfied:
∂1Ua(x(a), y(a)) = 12 [ua(x(a)) − ua(y(a))]+(x(a)‖y(a))u′a(x(a)) = 0 (11)
and
∂2Ub∗(x(a), y(a)) = 12 [ub∗ (x(a)) − ub∗(y(a))] (12)
− (1 − (x(a)‖y(a)))u′b∗(y(a)) = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we observe that both x and y are differen-
tiable on the interior of J (with left derivatives at zA).
Now assume that zA ≤ a∗ < b∗. To derive a contradiction, we shall show
below that, for any fixed a ∈ J,
∂1VA (a, b∗) = ∂1UzA (x(a), y(a))x
′(a) + ∂2UzA (x(a), y(a)) y
′(a) < 0. (13)
To this end, we begin by observing that, for each zA ≤ x < y < 1,
∂2UzA(x, y) =
1
2 (uzA(x) − uzA(y)) + (1 − (x‖y))u′zA(y)
< 12u
′
zA(y)(x − y) + (1 − (x‖y))u′zA(y)
= u′zA(y)(1 − y) < 0
17
where the first inequality follows from the fact that uzA is a strictly decreasing and
concave function on [zA, 1]. Secondly, we differentiate (11) and (12) to obtain the
system
[
∂11Ua (x(a), y(a)) ∂12Ua (x(a), y(a))
∂21Ub∗ (x(a), y(a)) ∂22Ub∗ (x(a), y(a))
] [
x′(a)
y′(a)
]
=
[
−ϑ
0
]
(14)
where
ϑ :=
∂
∂a
∂1Ua(x, y)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(x,y)=(x(a),y(a))
=
1
2
(u′a(y(a)) − u′a(x(a)) − (x(a) + y(a))u′′a(x(a))) .
By using the analogous reasoning that yielded (8) earlier, we find that ϑ > 0.
Moreover, it is routine to check that the discriminant ∆ of the linear system (14) is
positive. Thus, since
x′(a) =
(−ϑ
∆
)
∂22Ub∗ (x(a), y(a))
=
(−ϑ
∆
)
(u′b∗(y(a)) + (1 − x(a)‖y(a))u′′b∗(y(a)))
we find that x′(a) > 0. It is apparent from the second equation of (14) that
sgn(x′(a)) = sgn(y′(a)) so that we may also conclude that y′(a) > 0. Conse-
quently, claim (13) will follow if we can show that
∂1UzA (x(a), y(a)) < 0. (15)
To this end, observe that
∂
∂c
∂1Uc(x, y) =
1
2
(u′c(y) − u′c(x) − (x + y)u′′c (x)) > 0
whenever zA ≤ c < x < y
which is again proved in a way analogous to (8). Consequently, letting x = x(a)
and y = y(a), we get
∂
∂c
∂1Uc(x(a), y(a)) > 0 for all zA ≤ c ≤ a.
But since ∂1Ua(x(a), y(a)) = 0 by (11), this implies (15), and we conclude that
(13) holds. As noted earlier, this, in turn, establishes that a∗ < zA < b∗. Repeating
the same arguments for b∗ we also find a∗ < zB < b∗ in the analogous way, and
hence the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2. We begin by observing that BzB is a strictly increasing
function on [0, 1] (as shown within the proof of Lemma 1). Thus, it is invertible
on the set BzB ([0, 1]); we denote the associated inverse function by CzB .Clearly,
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CzB is differentiable everywhere on BzB ([0, 1]), and its derivative is continuous
everywhere but at BzB (zB).
Consider any (x∗, y∗) ∈ N (a∗, b∗). We claim that
x∗ < BzA(y
∗) (16)
and
BzB (x
∗) < y∗ (that is, x∗ < CzB (y∗)). (17)
In what follows, we shall only supply the arguments needed to establish (16), the
necessary arguments for (17) are similar and hence omitted.
Let x := BzA(y∗). If x∗ ≤ zA and y = zA,we have x∗ ≤ zA < x by (3). If
x∗ ≤ zA and y∗ = zA, then by Lemma 1 and (3), we get x∗ < y∗ = zA = x. The
nontrivial case to consider is, then, the case in which x∗ > zA. To deal with this
case, recall that the first order conditions yield
ua∗(x∗) − ua∗(y∗) + (x∗ + y∗)u′a∗(x∗) = 0 (18)
and
uzA(x) − uzA(y∗) + (x + y∗)u′zA(x) = 0. (19)
To prove (16), then, it is enough to show that the left hand side of (19) must be
strictly positive for x ≤ x∗. Since uzA is strictly decreasing and concave, it is easily
seen that if this is the case for x = x∗, it must be so for x < x∗ as well. Hence,
(16) will be established if we can show that
uzA(x
∗) − uzA(y∗) + (x∗ + y∗)u′zA(x∗) > 0. (20)
Solving for x∗ + y∗ in (18) and substituting the resulting expression in (20), and
then dividing both sides by u′(x∗ − zA), we find that (20) holds if and only if
T :=
u(x∗ − zA) − u(y∗ − zA)
u′(x∗ − zA) −
u(x∗ − a∗) − u(y∗ − a∗)
u′(x∗ − a∗) < 0. (21)
Now define the real map φ : R2+ → R by
φ(t, h) :=
u(x∗ − zA + h) − u(t + h)
u′(x∗ − zA + h)
and use Assumption [A1] to show that ∂∂hφ(t, h) > 0. (This step is analogous to
the analysis of the function H introduced in the proof of Theorem 1.) But then,
since zA − a∗ > 0 by Theorem 1,
T = φ(y∗ − zA, 0) − φ(y∗ − zA, zA − a∗) < 0
which yields (21) and hence (16).
Now let {(x′, y′)} = N (zA, zB). By the mean value theorem, and (16) and
(17), we get
x∗ − x′ < BzA(y∗) − x′ = BzA(y∗) − BzA(y′) = B′zA(w)(y∗ − y′) (22)
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and
x∗ − x′ < CzB (y∗) − x′ = CzB (y∗) − CzB (y′) = C ′zB (w′)(y∗ − y′) (23)
for some w,w′ ∈ [min{y∗, y′},max{y∗, y′}]. If y ≤ y′, then by (23) and the
fact that C ′zB (w
′) ≥ 1, we obtain x − x′ < y − y′. If y > y′, then by (22) and
the fact that B′zA(w) ≤ 1, we again get x − x′ < y − y′. We thus conclude that
x − y < x′ − y′ and the proof is complete.
Proofs of Theorems 3 and 4. While the arguments become considerably more
tedious, Theorems 3 and 4 are proved in precisely the same way we have proved
Theorems 1 and 2 above. For brevity, therefore, we omit these proofs here. The
detailed arguments can be obtained from any one of the authors upon request.
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